

Message Text

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FOR ANTHONY LAKE;WHITE HOUSE FOR BRZEZINSKI

E.O. 11652: GDS 3

TAGS: UK, PFOR, RH

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR US-UK CONSULTATIONS ON RHODESIA

1. FOLLOWING ARE APPROVED TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR CON-
SULTATIONS WITH THE BRITISH.

A. DISCUSSION OF ATTITUDES OF NATIONALISTS AND
FRONT LINE LEADERS TO THE CONFERENCE AND TO US
PARTICIPATION, INCLUDING THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT
US-UK IMPARTIALITY.

-- WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ISSUE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 093820

-- WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT THERE IS MUCH
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE
ATTITUDES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

-- WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE FRONT LINE
PRESIDENTS MAY HAVE BEEN LESS THAN HONEST IN THEIR
GENERALLY POLITE RECEPTION OF YOUR IDEAS.

WEFEEL THAT IT IS BEST TO TALK FRANKLY WITH THE AFRICANS ABOUT THEIR CONCERNS AND SUSPICIONS.

-- THOUGH IN SOME INSTANCES THE AFRICANS HAVE WELCOMED THE CONCEPT OF GREATER U.S. INVOLVEMENT, E.G. NYERERE, THEY ARE APPARENTLY FEARFUL THAT OUR INTEREST IS MOTIVATED ONLY BY A DESIRE TO THWART THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT WE MAY SEEK TO IMPOSE A "MODERATE" ANTI-SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON ZIMBABWE DURING THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- THE AFRICANS, EVEN KHAMA, SEE NO ROLE FOR THE U.S. IN WRITING A CONSTITUTION FOR A BRITISH COLONY AND ARE CONCERNED THAT OUR INVOLVEMENT SIGNIFIES A FURTHER BRITISH RETREAT FROM ITS COLONIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

-- THE AFRICANS ARE SUSPICIOUS THAT THE U.S. AND THE U.K. WILL BE OVERLY SOLICITOUS OF SMITH'S CONCERNS AND REACH FAVORABLE UNDERSTANDINGS WITH HIM WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH THE NATIONALISTS OR THE FRONT LINERS.

-- WE CAN ALLEVIATE THESE CONCERNS BY AGREEING THAT THERE WILL BE NO UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE US AND UK AND SMITH WHICH ARE NOT AGREED TO BY THE NATIONALIST LEADERS. THAT IS, THERE WILL BE NO "FIVE-POINTS" AGREEMENT AS THE BASIS FOR THE CONFERENCE OR DURING THE CONFERENCE.

-- WE CAN MAKE AN EARLY STATEMENT OF IMPARTIALITY --

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 093820

NOTING ESPECIALLY THAT WE DO NOT FAVOR CERTAIN NATIONALIST GROUPS OVER OTHERS.

-- WE CAN STRIVE IN PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CLEAR, COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE AIMS AND GROUND-RULES OF A CONFERENCE.

B. ORGANIZATION, TACTICS AND OBJECTIVES OF JOINT BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH AFRICAN LEADERS.

-- IN OUR OPINION, THE NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE TO DISCUSS FURTHER WITH THE AFRICANS THE AMERICAN ROLE IN THE CONFERENCE, AS WELL AS THE COURSE OF THE WHOLE PROCESS. WE CANNOT GO AHEAD WHILE THEY SO CLEARLY HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT US PARTICIPATION.

-- WE WILL BASE OUR DECISION ON OUR ROLE IN THE CONFERENCE AND IN PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE CONSULTATIONS.

-- JOINT BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE AFRICANS AT THIS STAGE MIGHT SEEM TO BE PRESENTING THEM WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI REGARDING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

-- WE WOULD PREFER TO MAINTAIN THE IMPRESSION OF CLOSE U.S.-U.K. CO-OPERATION, BUT WITHOUT GIVING THE AFRICANS THE IDEA THAT THEY HAVE NO INPUT INTO THE NATURE OF THE U.S. ROLE.

-- THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER SHOULD, THEREFORE,

SEE EACH LEADER FIRST, EXPLAINING THAT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WILL FOLLOW WITHIN A DAY OR TWO. THE OPTION WILL BE LEFT OPEN OF A FINAL MEETING WITH BOTH TOGETHER. (HOWEVER, IF BRITISH INSIST ON JOINT INITIAL MEETINGS, SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 093820

WE ARE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THIS.

-- WE SHOULD DRAFT COMMON INSTRUCTIONS TO OUR AMBASSADORS ON POINTS THAT SHOULD BE RAISED AND POSITIONS ON KEY QUESTIONS. WE SHOULD INCLUDE ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE AND NEGOTIATIONS AND WHAT THE U.S. IS WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE NEGOTIATING EFFORT. THE INSTRUCTIONS WOULD DESCRIBE JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. ROLE, AS BELOW, BUT MAKE IT CLEAR WE WANT THE AFRICANS' VIEWS ON WHAT ROLE WE COULD MOST USEFULLY PLAY.

-- WE SHOULD TALK FIRST WITH THE AFRICAN LEADERS WHOSE SUPPORT WILL BE EASIEST TO OBTAIN.

-- WE ARE AS CONCERNED AS YOU ABOUT THE QUESTION OF TIMING. WE DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO BE DRAGGING OUR FEET AND BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM.

-- ON THE OTHER HAND, WE DO NOT WANT TO TAKE STEPS WHICH WILL FORCE REJECTION FROM THE AFRICAN SIDE.

-- VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S POSSIBLE FORTHCOMING TRIP IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ELEMENT OF THESE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE AFRICANS CONCERNING THE RHODESIA CONFERENCE.

-- THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING A CONTACT OFFICE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA HAS MERIT AS A WAY OF DEMONSTRATING OUR INTEREST. AT THIS TIME AN OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN SALISBURY WOULD OFFER MORE LIABILITIES THAN REWARDS. WE

WOULD, HOWEVER, BE WILLING TO CONSIDER IT AS A POSSIBILITY SHOULD NEGOTIATIONS ACTUALLY BEGIN. AN OFFICE IN

LUSAKA OR ONE OF THE OTHER FRONT-LINE CAPITALS WOULD BE WORTH CONSIDERING, BUT ONLY AFTER SECURING AGREEMENT FROM
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 093820

THE AFRICANS ABOUT AN ACCEPTABLE U.S. ROLE. FOR THE PRESENT, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE THE NECESSARY CONTACTS THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS IN PLACE.

-- WE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY OUR KNOWLEDGE OF AFRICAN SENSITIVITIES OVER WHAT APPEARS TO THEM TO HAVE BEEN TOO CLOSE CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT WITH SMITH PRIOR TO GENEVA.

C. DISCUSSION OF A UNITED STATES ROLE DURING AND BEYOND THE CONFERENCE THAT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. DISCUSSION SHOULD INCLUDE:

1. GENERALLY, WE REGARD OUR ROLE AS ONE OF SUPPORTING THE BRITISH EFFORT.

-- WE WILL SUPPORT THE BRITISH DIPLOMATICALLY AND MAKE CERTAIN OUR EFFORTS TRACK WITH THEIRS.

-- WE ARE WILLING TO PROVIDE LIMITED FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR A SETTLEMENT BUT THIS POSES SOME PROBLEMS, E.G., THE ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND.

-- WE ARE WILLING TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SMITH AND VORSTER. WE RECOGNIZE THAT SOME U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO BRING SMITH AND VORSTER ALONG.

-- WE SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS THE ENFORCER; WE WILL NOT SEND TROOPS.

-- AT THIS STAGE, WE DO NOT WANT TO GET OUT AHEAD OF THE BRITISH IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON VARIOUS PARTIES.

-- WE WANT TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO BRITISH REQUESTS FOR HELP ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT MAY NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ASSUME
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 093820

FORMALLY PART OF BRITAIN'S NEGOTIATING ROLE AND RESPONSIB-

ILITIES AS THE COLONIAL POWER. IN SOME INSTANCES, U.S. INVOLVEMENT MIGHT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

2. THE PROPOSED UNITED STATES ROLE IN THE CONFERENCE.

-- THE UNITED STATES REMAINS WILLING TO CO-CONVENE THE CONFERENCE IF IT WOULD HELP PRODUCE A SETTLEMENT.

-- HOWEVER, THE AFRICANS HAVE UNDERSTANDABLE OBJECTIONS TO A MAJOR UNITED STATES ROLE IN THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN FULL SUPPORT FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE FRONT-LINE STATES AND FULL PARTICIPATION BY THE NATIONALIST GROUPS.

-- THEREFORE, THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE TO CONSULT WITH THE AFRICANS ABOUT THE CONFERENCE AND THE U.S. ROLE IN IT. BEFORE SUCH CONSULTATIONS, WE COULD TRY TO DEVELOP COMMON POSITIONS ON THE QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIONS WE KNOW WILL BE RAISED.

-- IN PREPARING FOR TALKS IN AFRICA, WE SHOULD DISCUSS ACTIONS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN TO BUILD AFRICAN CONFIDENCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- WE SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR UNITED STATES PRESENCE AT THE CONFERENCE. OBSERVER OR LIAISON STATUS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

- IN THIS ROLE, THE UNITED STATES WOULD WORK BEHIND THE SCENES AND USE ITS LEVERAGE TO HELP BREAK DEADLOCKS.

- OBSERVERS COULD BE GRANTED SPEAKING PRIVILEGES.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 093820

- WE COULD SEND A FAIRLY SIZEABLE DELEGATION HEADED BY A SENIOR PERSON WHO WOULD REMAIN AT THE CONFERENCE FULLTIME.

-- IN OUR VIEW, THE FRONT-LINE STATES SHOULD BE INVITED IN AN OBSERVER OR IN A LIAISON CAPACITY IF THE NATIONALISTS HAVE NO OBJECTION. THEIR SUPPORT WILL BE NEEDED IF A SETTLEMENT IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL, PARTICULARLY IN RESTRAINING GUERRILLA FACTIONS THAT MIGHT NOT LIKE THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT. THEY CAN ALSO BE HELPFUL IN PUSHING NATIONALIST GROUPS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT.

-- WE COULD LEAVE OPEN THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE

UNITED STATES AND FRONT-LINE COUNTRIES SHOULD BE GUARANTORS OF INTERIM PEACE-KEEPING ARRANGEMENTS. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR US TO SIGN A DRAFT CONSTITUTION.

-- NIGERIAN ROLE -- THROUGH COMMONWEALTH OFFICE?

-- IF THE AFRICANS RAISE THE USSR ROLE, SHOULD THE BRITISH EMPHASIZE WITH AFRICANS THAT THEY WILL KEEP THE SOVIETS INFORMED?

3. THE PROPOSED US ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT.

-- YOU MENTIONED THAT THE US MIGHT PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. WHAT KIND OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT DO YOU HAVE IN MIND? DOES IT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING?

- WEAPONS
 - NON-LETHAL SUPPLIES, SUCH AS TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT AND FOOD
 - US PLANES AND PILOTS TO FERRY TROOPS
 - USE OF US MILITARY FACILITIES
 - U.S. FINANCIAL SUPPORT
- SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 093820

WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, BUT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL WOULD BE NEEDED. WE CANNOT MAKE ADVANCE COMMITMENTS NOW.

4. PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND:

-- THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FROM CONGRESS FOR THE FIRST YEAR'S CONTRIBUTION TO THIS FUND. HE FEELS THIS WOULD HELP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, HE IS RUNNING INTO CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY.

-- CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING CONCERNS:

A. THE PURPOSE OF THE FUND IS VAGUE. IT BEGAN AS AN ECONOMIC SAFETY NET FOR WHITES. IT IS NOW A GENERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FUND. THERE IS NOT YET ANY INDICATION OF SPECIFIC PROJECTS--WHICH CAUSES CONGRESS TO HESITATE.

B. THERE IS CONCERN THAT THE FUND MAY STILL BECOME A BUY-OUT FOR WHITES IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. LIBERAL MEMBERS OF CONGRESS BELIEVE THIS WOULD NOT BE

ACCEPTABLE TO NATIONALISTS OR TO AFRICA GENERALLY.

C. THE MONEY MAY NOT EVEN BE SPENT IN THE NEXT YEAR.

D. IT IS UNCERTAIN WHAT THE NATURE OF THE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT WILL BE.

E. THE FUND DWARFS ALL OTHER U.S. ASSISTANCE TO SINGLE AFRICAN COUNTRIES. THERE IS SOME DOUBT THAT THIS MUCH CAN BE ABSORBED EFFECTIVELY IN THE FIRST YEAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 093820

--WE BELIEVE IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE U.S. AND BRITAIN AGREE TO A CLEAR DEFINITION OF THE FUND ALONG THE LINES WE HAVE BEEN USING IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CONGRESS:

A. THE FUND WILL BE USED FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES.

B. THE PROJECTS FUNDED WILL BE PROPOSED BY THE INTERIM AND INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS OF ZIMBABWE.

C. CONTROL ON PROJECTS FUNDED WILL BE EXERCISED BY WORLD BANK OR OTHER ECONOMISTS. THEY WILL BE EVALUATED ON ECONOMIC, NOT POLITICAL GROUNDS.

D. WE ASSUME THAT THE MAIN USES OF THE FUND WILL BE: EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR AFRICANS; LAND RE-ALLOCATION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT; HOUSING ASSISTANCE. BUT THE USES WILL BE FOR ZIMBABWE TO DECIDE.

E. THE PLAN WOULD ALSO HELP THE WHITES WHO WOULD BENEFIT FROM THE GENERAL STIMULUS OF SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT IN THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY.

D. CONTINGENCIES OF NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE BY SOME OF THE GENEVA PRINCIPALS.

-- THE CONFERENCE SHOULD PROCEED IF ALL OF THE NATIONALISTS AGREE TO ATTEND, WHETHER OR NOT SMITH PLANS TO BE REPRESENTED.

-- OPPORTUNITIES SHOULD EXIST FOR SMITH THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS TO BECOME INVOLVED IF INITIALLY RELUCTANT TO DO SO.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 093820

-- WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS ON THIS, PARTICULARLY TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA. IF THEY FEEL IT WOULD BE WISE TO GO AHEAD WITH A CONFERENCE WITHOUT SOME OF THE NATIONALIST GROUPS PRESENT, WE SHOULD DO SO. THIS HOWEVER DOES NOT MEAN THE FRONT LINE STATES SHOULD HAVE A VETO OVER WHO MAY ATTEND.

-- HOWEVER, IF THE FRONT-LINE STATES OPPOSE A CONFERENCE WITHOUT CERTAIN GROUPS, THE CONFERENCE SHOULD NOT BE HELD. SUCH A CONFERENCE, EVEN IF A SETTLEMENT WERE AGREED TO, WOULD ONLY RESULT IN ANOTHER ANGOLA. AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE FRONT-LINE STATES AGAINST ATTACKS BY OUTSIDE GUERRILLA FACTIONS IF A BLOODY CIVIL WAR IS TO BE AVOIDED.

-- WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE FRONT-LINE STATES AND THE NATIONALISTS DO NOT ALWAYS COINCIDE. WE SHOULD TRY TO AVOID GETTING CAUGHT BETWEEN THEM.

-- WE AGREE THAT THE PF WILL EVENTUALLY SPLIT, BUT DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ALLURE OF THE CONFERENCE PROVIDES SUFFICIENT ATTRACTION FOR NKOMO TO TAKE LEAVE OF MUGABE. FURTHER, PF UNITY IS THE PRIMARY CURRENT GOAL OF THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS AS DEMONSTRATED BY THEIR FIXATION ON THIS TOPIC AT THEIR LUANDA MEETING.

-- WE SHOULD AVOID ANY ACTIONS WHICH LEAVE US OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF TRYING TO DESTROY PF UNITY. SHOULD THE ALLIANCE FALL BY ITS OWN WEIGHT ON THIS ISSUE, HOWEVER, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE NEW SITUATION.

-- SMITH WILL PRESS FOR AN INVITATION TO ZUPO. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE, THOUGH WE MIGHT SUGGEST THAT HE BRING SOME
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 093820

AFRICANS AS MEMBERS OF HIS OWN DELEGATION.

-- WE MIGHT ALSO EXPLORE THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING FOR NON-PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE, SUCH AS OTHER WHITE RHODESIAN POLITICAL GROUPS, A MANNER IN WHICH THEY COULD FORMALLY PRESENT THEIR VIEWS.

-- WE MIGHT ALSO WANT TO GIVE MORE THOUGHT TO A CONFERENCE ATTENDED NOT BY THE PRINCIPALS AT THE OUTSET, BUT BY THEIR DEPUTIES AND LEGAL ADVISERS. THIS MIGHT BE MORE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

-- THE UK AND US NEED TO GAIN GREATER AFRICAN CONFIDENCE.

-- THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS MIGHT HELP PERSUADE THE AFRICAN NATIONALISTS THAT THE US AND THE UK ARE SYMPATHETIC WITH THEIR AIMS AND CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF BLACKS IN ZIMBABWE, NOT JUST OF WHITES:

- FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH THE NATIONALIST LEADERS OF THE ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND AS AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

-- CONSULTATIONS WITH THE NATIONALIST LEADERS ON AN IMPARTIAL BASIS THAT ARE AT LEAST AS FREQUENT, AS HIGH-LEVEL, AND AS SPECIFIC AS THE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE WHITE REGIMES. THIS WOULD BE A MARKED CHANGE FROM THE KISSINGER NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN THE U.S. DID NOT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH NATIONALIST LEADERS. WE SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE FREQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES.

-- INCREASED ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES.

-- INCREASED EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR ZIMBABWE STUDENTS SELECTED BY NATIONALIST GROUPS (THE U.S. SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 12 STATE 093820

HAS A SMALL-SCALE PROGRAM OF THIS KIND).

--THE PRESSURE OF THE WAR ITSELF WILL HELP BRING SMITH CLOSER TO AGREEING TO MAJORITY RULE; BUT ADDITIONAL NON-VIOLENT PRESSURE FROM THE WEST WOULD ALSO BE VALUABLE. THE FOLLOWING POSSIBLE ACTIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITHIN BOTH GOVERNMENTS:

- MEASURES FOR INCREASING COMPLIANCE WITH ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AMONG OUR ALLIES, E.G., BILATERAL NEGOTIATING EFFORTS, AMERICAN ENFORCEMENT OF THE CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN SECTION IN ITS RHODESIAN CHROME BILL.

- ACTIONS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN IN THE WEST TO DISCOURAGE MERCENARIES FROM GOING TO FIGHT IN RHODESIA.

- U.S. ACTION AGAINST THE RHODESIAN INFORMATION OFFICE.

- SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES THAT MAY CUT DOWN ON INDIRECT TRADE WITH RHODESIA THROUGH SOUTH AFRICA.

- A STRONGER STATEMENT THAN HAS BEEN MADE BY THE U.S. BEFORE THAT IT WILL NOT COME TO THE AID OF THE SMITH REGIME UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.

- SHOULD THERE BE A JOINT U.S.-U.K. PLANNING GROUP ON THESE MEASURES.

-- IF THE NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT MAKE ANY HEADWAY, THERE WILL BE AFRICAN PRESSURE FOR TOUGHER DEALING WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON ITS AID TO RHODESIA. WE SHOULD DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE DEMANDS FOR ACTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND HOW THEY WILL BE DEALT WITH:

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 13 STATE 093820

-- IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AS A FIRST STEP, THE AFRICANS WILL WANT A MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, TIED NOT ONLY TO NAMIBIA BUT TO RHODESIA AS WELL.

-- THERE MAY BE A DEMAND THAT THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA BE APPLIED TO SOUTH AFRICA AS WELL.

-- THERE MAY BE A CALL FOR AN OIL EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

-- IN OUR BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, WE COULD CONTINUE TO POINT OUT THAT IT IS HARDLY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTEREST TO ALLOW A MILITARY SOLUTION IN RHODESIA. THE WHITE REGIME CANNOT AFFORD A BLACK MILITARY VICTORY, OR ADDITIONAL COMMUNIST WEAPONS AND TROOPS IN THE AREA, OR A ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT THAT IS DEEPLY INDEBTED TO THE SOVIET UNION.

-- WE COULD POINT OUT TO THE AFRICANS THAT THE GREATEST INCENTIVE FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO FORCE A SETTLEMENT WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT BY THE NATIONALIST GROUPS TO A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION. IF ALL THE GROUPS AGREE, FOR INSTANCE, TO FREE ELECTIONS WITH ALL PARTIES PARTICIPATING AND TO STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS GUARANTEES, IT WILL MAKE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT EVEN MORE ATTRACTIVE.

E. NATURE AND KEY ISSUES OF NEGOTIATING A CONSTITUTION AND HOLDING ELECTIONS.

-- WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR THINKING ON KEY PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN A CONSTITUTION,

WHERE THE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES ARE GOING TO BE IN GAINING AGREEMENT, AND WHETHER WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN ANY AGREEMENT ON FUNDAMENTALS BEFORE THE CONFERENCE BEGINS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 14 STATE 093820

-- WE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS ARE LIKELY TO COME UP IN OUR PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS WITH AFRICAN LEADERS.

F. ANNOUNCEMENT OF INTENTIONS

-- WE SHOULD NOT ANHOUNCE THAT WE INTEND TO PURSUE JOINT, BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON A CONSTITUTION UNTIL WE HAVE TALKED WITH THE AFRICANS.

-- UK CAN ANNOUNCE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WILL BE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE AFRICANS AND THAT THERE WILL BE CONTINUING CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON THIS.

G. TIMETABLE FOR FURTHER STEPS.

-- WE ARE WILLING TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY WITH THE CONSULTATIONS WITH AFRICAN LEADERS. EVEN IF THE PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS ARE NOT COMPLETED, WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO REASSESS THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO LONDON.
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